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abstract
Pettigrew offers new axiomatic constraints on legitimate measures of inaccuracy.
His axiom called ‘Decomposition’ stipulates that legitimate measures of inaccuracy
evaluate a credence function in part based on its level of calibration at a world. I
argue that if calibration is valuable, as Pettigrew claims, then this fact is an explan-
andum for accuracy-rst epistemologists, not an explanans, for three reasons. First,
the intuitive case for the importance of calibration isn’t as strong as Pettigrew
believes. Second, calibration is a perniciously global property that both contra-
venes Pettigrew’s own views about the nature of credence functions themselves
and undercuts the achievements and ambitions of accuracy-rst epistemology.
Finally, Decomposition introduces a new kind of value compatible with but separ-
ate from accuracy-proper in violation of Pettigrew’s alethic monism.
introduction
Credal states can be epistemically good for a number of reasons. They can be informative,
justied by the evidence, coherent, or explanatory. They can also be accurate – i.e., they
can place high condence in truths and low condence in falsehoods. According to
accuracy-rst epistemology, it’s this last virtue and only this last virtue that matters.
Many norms of epistemic rationality, however, don’t simply tell us to be accurate. They
tell us, for instance, to obey probabilism, update by conditionalization, defer to chance,
and follow the evidence. Accuracy-rsters must then justify these norms by demonstrating
their instrumental connection to the rational pursuit of accuracy. Toward this end they
treat accuracy as the epistemic analog of practical utility. By appeal to legitimate measures
of accuracy and standard principles of rational choice, they argue that rational epistemic
agents who care solely about accuracy will obey them. In other words, by treating accur-
acy as epistemic utility, they justify important derivative norms governing credences.
Richard Pettigrew’s Accuracy and the Laws of Credence is a fantastic contribution
to this project. Pettigrew presents the tremendous accomplishments of epistemic utility
theory to date (many of which he himself is responsible for) and then goes on to make
novel contributions, including new arguments for conditionalization and probabilism
based on his latest account of alethic epistemic value.
Despite these accomplishments, however, there remains one major chink in the armor
of accuracy-rst epistemology. All arguments in favor of fundamental norms such as pro-
babilism only work for a privileged set of measures of inaccuracy. They fail miserably, in
fact, according to some very natural alternative measures. In other words, these arguments
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all rely on the notion of ‘proximity to the truth’ being formalized in a contentious way.
Accuracy-rsters then owe a philosophical account of why only their favored measures
of inaccuracy are legitimate.
Joyce (1998, 2009) and Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010) have attempted to provide such
an account, but Pettigrew devotes Chapter 3 of his book to explaining why such attempts
fail. In Chapter 4, he offers his own new axiomatic constraints on legitimate measures of
inaccuracy. He goes on to show that any measure that meets his constraints delivers the
desired results. Most importantly, if a measure is Pettigrew-legitimate, then every non-
probability function is accuracy-dominated, and no probability functions are dominated.
The maths is right, but I don’t think Pettigrew’s axioms are. Pettigrew’s most interesting
axiom, which he calls DECOMPOSITION, stipulates that legitimate measures of inaccuracy
evaluate a credence in part based on its level of calibration at a world. I argue that if cali-
bration is valuable, as Pettigrew claims, then this fact is an explanandum for accuracy-rst
epistemologists, not an explanans for three reasons. First, the intuitive case for the import-
ance of calibration isn’t as strong as Pettigrew believes. Second, calibration is a perni-
ciously global property that both contravenes Pettigrew’s own views about the nature
of credence functions themselves and undercuts the achievements and ambitions of
accuracy-rst epistemology. Finally, DECOMPOSITION introduces a new kind of value com-
patible with but separate from accuracy-proper in violation of Pettigrew’s alethic monism.
Therefore, the main gap in the accuracy-based arguments of epistemic utility theory
remains. Even if the only nal epistemic end is accuracy, epistemic utility theory has no
convincing argument for the claim that only its favored measures are legitimate.
1. the challenge
To understand the importance of restrictions on measures of inaccuracy, let’s rst examine
an epistemic-utility argument for probabilism. This argument comes in many different ver-
sions, but the basic idea runs as follows. If an agent has a credence function b that doesn’t
obey the laws of probability, then according to any legitimate measure of inaccuracy, b is
guaranteed to be less accurate at every world than some probability function b′. In other
words, b is accuracy-dominated. No probability function, however, is even weakly domi-
nated. That is, for any probability function c and any function c′, c is strictly more accur-
ate than c′ at some world. Therefore, if accuracy is epistemic utility, adopting a
non-probability function as one’s credence function is epistemically irrational because
that function is dominated by an undominated alternative.
Now, for this argument to work, we need a precise understanding of what counts as a
legitimate measure of inaccuracy. The fundamental idea, of course, is that credences closer
to truth-values are less inaccurate. A credence of .6 in a truth is less inaccurate than a cre-
dence of .5 in the same proposition. Likewise, an entire credence function that’s uniformly
closer to the truth than another is overall less inaccurate.
To formalize this notion, let W be a set of worlds, and F be a set of propositions over
W. For X [ F , we let vw (X ) = 1 (=0) if X is true (false) at w. bel(F) is the set of belief
functions over F , where a belief function assigns some number x in [0,1] to each propos-
ition in F . Note that probability functions are belief functions.
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A measure of inaccuracy (also known as a scoring rule) is a function
I : bel(F) ×W  R+≥0 that is intended to measure how ‘close’ a belief function is to
the truth at a given world.
The most common inaccuracy measure, and the one Pettigrew himself eventually
endorses, is the Brier Score:
B(c,w) =
∑
X[F
vw(X) − c(X)( )2
The Brier Score is quite natural. It measures the squared Euclidean distance between c
and vw. As de Finetti (1974) shows, if inaccuracy is measured with the Brier Score, then
the dominance argument for probabilism rehearsed above goes through. That is, all and
only non-probability functions are undominated.
However, the same cannot be said for other natural measures, such as the Absolute
Value Score:
A(c,w) =
∑
X[F
vw(X) − c(X)| |
This score identies the inaccuracy of c at w with the sum of the positive pointwise differ-
ences between vw and c.
To see why A won’t work for our dominance argument, consider:
URN: Suppose an urn contains a Red, Green, and White ball, one of which is sure to be
drawn, with R, G, and W denoting the relevant propositions. Alice has credence 1/3 in
each of R, G, and W, while Bob has credence 0 in each. According to A, Bob is sure to
have a total score of 1, regardless of which ball is in fact drawn. Alice, however, is sure
to receive a score of 1/3 + 2/3 + 2/3 = 5/3. So, according to A, Bob’s non-probabilistic cre-
dence function accuracy dominates Alice’s probabilistic one.
It is hard to see ex ante why B but not A should count as legitimate. Both are standard
measures of divergence, and both are continuous in their rst argument. Most import-
antly, both obey the following Pareto Principle, which is a fundamental constraint on
any measure of inaccuracy:
TRUTH-DIRECTEDNESS: Suppose I is a legitimate measure of inaccuracy. If |b(X )− vw
(X )| ≥ |c(X )− vw (X )| for all X [ F , and |b(X )− vw (X )| .|c(X )− vw (X )| for some
X [ F , then I(c,w) , I(b,w).
That is, if b is at least as inaccurate as c for every proposition and sometimes more inaccur-
ate, then b should count as more inaccurate overall. We will frequently refer back to this
principle below.
The challenge that accuracy-rsters face is to justify constraints that rule out measures
that don’t support the argument for probabilism (such as A) while permitting at least some
measures that do (such as B). As mentioned above, Pettigrew thinks (and I agree) that all
previous attempts are unsuccessful. The rest of this essay is devoted to examining the con-
straints Pettigrew currently advocates.
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1.1. Pettigrew’s Constraints
My main focus in this article is on Pettigrew’s axiom of DECOMPOSITION. Nonetheless, to
get a better picture of Pettigrew’s view of accuracy, it’s worth laying out all of ve of
his axioms in brief.1 The axiom DIVERGENCE ADDITIVITY in particular will be of importance
to later discussion.
The rst constraint Pettigrew endorses in his ofcial argument is:
ALETHIC VINDICATION: The omniscient credence function at a world is the ideal credence
function to have at that world. Thus, vw is the ideal credence function at w.
Given alethic monism, this constraint is mandatory. The best credence function to have at
a world is the one that assigns credence 1 to all truths and credence 0 to all falsehoods at
that world. Pettigrew’s second constraint is slightly more loaded, but relatively unobjec-
tionable to accuracy-rsters. It says simply that legitimate measures of inaccuracy should
be divergences from the omniscient credence function. A function D is a divergence if D(c,
c′)≥ 0 and D(c, c′) = 0 just in case c = c′. The constraint is:
PERFECTIONISM: If I is a legitimate inaccuracy measure, there is a divergence D such that
I(c,w) = ID(c,w) = D(vw, c). We say that D generates I .
Inaccuracy is supposed to measure how ‘far’ a credence function is from the truth.
Together with ALETHIC VINDICATION, this axiom entails that I(c,w) ≥ 0, and I(c,w) = 0
just in case c = vw. Furthermore, because I is generated by D, we can appeal to D to meas-
ure how far apart two credence functions are from one another.
The third axiom relates the divergence between entire credence functions (the global
divergence) to the divergence between the credences they assign to individual propositions
(the local divergences). In particular, it requires that we simply identify the global diver-
gence with the sum of the local divergences:
DIVERGENCE ADDITIVITY: If I is a legitimate inaccuracy measure generated by D, there is a
one-dimensional divergence d such that D(c, c′) =∑X[F d(c(X), c′(X)). We say that d gen-
erates D.
Note that the three axioms listed so far jointly entail that if I is a legitimate measure of
inaccuracy, then I(c,w) =∑ d(vw(X), c(X)). That is, the inaccuracy of an entire credence
function simply is the sum of the inaccuracy (i.e., divergence) between an agent’s credence
in each proposition and the truth-value of that proposition at a world. We’ll have more to
say about this third axiom later.
The fourth axiom rules out major jumps in inaccuracy or divergence.
1 I’ll only discuss the list of axioms on p. 65 of Pettigrew’s book. He also endorses an additional axiom
that ends up entailing that the Brier Score is the only correct measure of inaccuracy, but that won’t come
into play here.
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DIVERGENCE CONTINUITY: If I is a legitimate inaccuracy measure generated by an additive
divergence D that is generated by d, then d is continuous in its rst and second argument.
This axiom may be controverted, but I have no objection to it. I wish only to pause to
point out:
(1) A and B are both compatible with the four axioms listed so far.
(2) These four axioms entail TRUTH-DIRECTEDNESS.
So, these axioms are not yet strong enough to deliver the desired results, but they do entail
the most obvious restriction on legitimacy, i.e., TRUTH-DIRECTEDNESS.
1.2. Calibration
The main axiom of interest requires a bit of preliminary discussion. Pettigrew appeals to a
notion he calls calibration inaccuracy, which is different to the notion of inaccuracy
proper.
We say that a credence function c is well-calibrated if 100x% of the propositions c
assigns credence x to are true. That is, c is well calibrated at a world w if, for every x
in c’s range:
x = {X [ F : c(X) = x, vw(X) = 1}| |{X [ F : c(X) = x}| |
Perfect calibration is, intuitively, an attractive feature of a credence function. If you’re a
weather-forecaster, approximately 80% of the time you assign forecast rain with 80%
probability, it should actually rain. If not, something’s off: The set of propositions you
assign credence .8 to does not have the right truth-frequency.
Indeed, as Pettigrew notes, philosophers such as van Fraassen (1983) and Shimony
(1988) are pure calibrationists. They claim that credences aim not at truth but at frequency
of truth. That is, they claim that c is perfectly vindicated at w not when c = vw, but when c
is well-calibrated.2
If we adopt such a purely calibrationist view, we can try to measure the value of a cre-
dence function at a world by its proximity to perfect calibration instead of by its proximity
to truth. This is a bit tricky, since many different credence functions are calibrated at the
same world. vw, for instance, is well calibrated. But if F is closed under negation, then the
function c.5 that assigns credence .5 to every single proposition in F is also well calibrated.
Pettigrew claims that each credence function c is naturally compared on this view to its
well-calibrated counterpart at w, denoted cw, dened as:
cw(Z) := {X [ F : c(X) = c(Z), vw(X) = 1}| |{X [ F : c(X) = c(Z)}| |
2 Ramsey (1931) also appeals to a notion of calibration to determine which credence functions are ideal,
but his is different to the one explicated here.
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cw corrects c’s mis-calibration. For instance, suppose only 70% of the propositions c
assigns credence .8 to are true. Then cw assigns each of those propositions credence .7.
Thus, cw functions as a re-calibration of c at w.
Whereas c’s inaccuracy proper is divergence from vw, c’s calibration inaccuracy is its
divergence from cw. That is, the calibration inaccuracy of c at w relative to divergence
D is D(cw, c).
As should be clear, we can’t identify calibration inaccuracy with inaccuracy proper.
After all, c.5 dened above is well calibrated, but it’s not perfectly accurate. Indeed, cali-
bration inaccuracy isn’t even truth-directed. Suppose:
• F = {X,¬X}
• vw (X ) = 1
• c.99 (X ) = .99, and c.99 (¬X ) = .01.
Then c.99 is not well calibrated, but c.5 is. By TRUTH-DIRECTEDNESS, however, c.99 is strictly
more accurate than c.5.
So, Pettigrew disagrees with those who identify vindication with calibration. However,
he thinks that calibration is nonetheless desirable ceteris paribus. In particular, according
to Pettigrew, cw should be less inaccurate overall than c at w (assuming c≠ cw).
Calibration should count for something.
In addition to any miscalibration, the inaccuracy of c’s well-calibrated counterpart
should count toward c’s inaccuracy as well. If cw = c.5, for instance, then even after c is
recalibrated, it’s still not especially accurate. That is, once we correct for one of c’s
aws (its calibration inaccuracy), another aw still remains (its remaining inaccuracy
proper). On the other hand, if cw = vw, then after recalibration c is perfectly accurate, so
there should be no additional penalty.
Pettigrew’s nal constraint puts these two intuitions together. c’s inaccuracy, according
to Pettigrew, should simply be the (weighted) sum of its calibration inaccuracy (i.e., its
divergence from cw) and cw’s inaccuracy (i.e., cw’s divergence from vw). More explicitly,
the nal constraint is:
DECOMPOSITION: If I is a legitimate inaccuracy measure generated by a divergence D, then
there are [positive real numbers] α, β such that:
D(vw, c) = aD(cw, c) + bD(vw, cw)
Note that DECOMPOSITION helps explain what’s wrong with the Absolute Value Score A.
Recall in URN, a credence function c0 that assigned credence 0 to R, G, and W
A-dominated a credence function c1/3 that assigned credence 1/3 to each of those proposi-
tions even though exactly one of those propositions was sure to be true. c1/3 just is the
well-calibrated counterpart of itself and of c0 at each world. Therefore, DECOMPOSITION
entails that c1/3 is less inaccurate than c0, a fact with which the Brier Score, but not the
Absolute Value Score, agrees.
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2. objections to decomposition
I’ll now argue that Pettigrew in particular and accuracy-rsters in general should reject the
axiom of DECOMPOSITION. Although it’s indeed true that highly accurate credences tend to
be nearly well-calibrated, this is a fact that should be derived and not taken for granted.3
2.1. The Intuitive Case
The rst problem with the appeal to calibration is that the intuitive case for its importance
is weaker than Pettigrew claims. One important idea motivating DECOMPOSITION is that for
any function c, it’s natural to evaluate c not just against vw but against c
w as well. cw, in
other words, is intuitively a function against which we should measure c’s success at a
world.
It does seem true that professional weather-forecasters should be well-calibrated.
Surely, as we already observed, of the days when a weatherperson forecasts rain with x
probability, it should rain about x proportion of the time. So, initially, it seems that cw
is a clear benchmark that’s at least as good overall as c at w.
However, I think this intuition has bite only for special kinds of credence functions and
sets of propositions. There’s little motivation for thinking cw is a good bar for comparison
for general c and F . To see why, consider the following three cases:
(1) Suppose c1 assigns credence .9 to the propositions that it will rain on Monday (Rm)
and that it will rain on Tuesday (Rt). c1 has no opinion about any other propositions.
So, cw1 (Rm) = cw1 (Rt) = 0, .5,or 1 depending on whether it rains on one day, both
days, or neither day.
(2) c2 is dened on the large set of propositions F = {R1, . . . ,R1,000}, where Ri is the
proposition that it rains on day i. Suppose exactly 60% of the Ri’s are true.
For each i, c2 (Ri) is very close to .6, but always just a little above or
below. Furthermore, no two credences are exactly the same. That is, c2(Ri)≠ c2 (Rj)
if i≠ j. Note that cw2 (Ri) = vw(Ri) = 1 or 0 for all i.
(3) Suppose B is a large set of propositions about weather in Bristol, 90% of which are
true. T is an equally large set of propositions about toadstool biology, 50% of which
are true. c3 assigns credence .7 to each and every proposition in F = B< T . Note
that c3 = cw3 .
If we were trying to design a legitimate measure of inaccuracy, these cases would hardly
motivate any evaluative appeal to Pettigrew’s notion of calibration or well calibrated
counterpart. Indeed, in each case cwi seems evaluatively irrelevant. In (1), F is too small
for cw1 to be intuitively important for the purposes of evaluation. That is, if we were to
3 Mathematically, for the accuracy-dominance argument to work, Pettigrew needs to restrict the class of
legitimate measures to those that are additive, continuous, and strictly proper. A measure I is strictly
proper if every probability function assigns itself strictly lower expected inaccuracy than it assigns to
any other measure. DeGroot and Fienberg (1982, 1983) prove that all such measures in fact obey
the axiom of DECOMPOSITION. Pettigrew argues in Chapter 3, however, that we should not rule out
improper measures ex ante. So, his result that measures obeying his ve axioms are strictly proper
can be thought of as the inverse of the DeGroot-Fienberg Theorem.
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evaluate what’s right or wrong with c1 from an intuitive standpoint, we may appeal to its
proximity to truth, but we would hardly mention its proximity to calibration.
In (2), we might think of c2 as nearly calibrated in some sense, but under the ofcial
denition its well-calibrated counterpart is vw, so it ends up with high calibration inaccur-
acy according to the ofcial notion. Calibration accuracy here, despite the large set of pro-
positions, is not especially relevant save for the fact that it coincides perfectly in this case
with accuracy proper.
In (3), c3 is fairly unreliable over both B and T . That is, when we restrict c3’s domain
to its natural subject matter, c3 is mis-calibrated. However, it all averages out over the
full domain, and c3 ends up perfectly calibrated over the full, rather gerrymandered set
of propositions F .
Intuitively, then, Pettigrew’s notion of calibration seems to come out of left eld when
we think about a number of different kinds of cases. cw simply isn’t a natural counterpart
to compare c to in general. It is an appealing comparison, admittedly, when we are think-
ing about weatherpersons who frequently forecast exactly the same probability many
times about propositions with similar subject matter. Near calibration here indicates a
kind of reliability. However, it’s a mistake to take calibration to be such an important
intuitive notion relevant to the concept of accuracy based on these sorts of cases. The intu-
ition that calibration matters for accuracy, or even that a credence function is naturally
compared to its well-calibrated counterpart, is insufciently general to motivate
DECOMPOSITION.
2.2. Globalism
The second problem with DECOMPOSITION is that it invokes an irreducibly global concept to
constrain the notion of legitimate inaccuracy.
By global, I mean that the value of cw (X ) depends on more than just c(X ) and vw (X ).
It also depends on the credence c and vw assign to other propositions as well. For instance,
if c assigns credence .5 only to X and Y, then the value of cw (X ) is affected by the truth-
value of Y even if X and Y have nothing to do with one another. Because Pettigrew invokes
such a global notion in DECOMPOSITION, he renders the notion of a legitimate inaccuracy
measure irreducibly global as well.
This nonlocality is problematic for Pettigrew in particular. In fact, it conicts with the
motivation he provides for his DIVERGENCE ADDITIVITY axiom, which requires that the
overall inaccuracy of a credence function c be the sum of the divergences between c(X )
and vw (X ) for each X:
When we say that we represent an agent by her credence function, it can sound as if we’re repre-
senting her as having a single, unied doxastic state. But that’s not what’s going on. Really, we are
just representing her as having an agglomeration of individual doxastic states, namely, the individ-
ual credences she assigns to the various propositions about which she has an opinion. A credence
function is simply a mathematical way of representing this agglomeration; it is a way of collecting
together these individual credences into a single object.
To illustrate the point, it might help to compare a credence function to a musical melody.
Suppose I were to ask how far one melody lies from another. I would not simply treat each as
a sequence of notes (pitches and durations) and measure the distance between each note in one
and its counterpart in the other, and then sum them up. Rather, I would treat each melody as
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an integrated whole and I would ask how far the overall ‘shape’ of one lies from the overall ‘shape’
of the other. A credence function, on the other hand, is not an integrated whole – it is simply a
mathematical representation of a list of credence-proposition pairings. Thus, we need not look
to its ‘shape’ when we measure its distance from another credence function. (p. 49, emphasis mine)
The idea here is that credence functions are not holistic entities, but simply a way of
listing out individual doxastic attitudes which are to be assessed without regard to one
another. By appealing to calibration, however, Pettigrew requires precisely the opposite.
How we assess what you think about one proposition depends on what you think
about other propositions.
Additionally, regardless of Pettigrew’s motivation for other axioms, invoking calibra-
tion in DECOMPOSITION undercuts the achievements of accuracy-rst epistemology. One
goal of AFE is to justify global rational constraints on credence functions that aren’t them-
selves explicitly alethic by appeal to local, alethic evaluations. For instance, the norm of
probabilism is a global constraint: whether c is a probability function or not depends
on the relationship between c’s attitudes toward the various propositions in F . It also is
not explicitly alethic: probabilism doesn’t say anything about the pursuit of the truth or
accuracy. The accuracy-rst justication for probabilism aims to explain why probabilism
is nonetheless a legitimate norm without appealing directly to any structural relationships
between c’s credences. Instead, it shows that such a relationship emerges from an agent’s
rational pursuit of accuracy. If the rational agent simply wants each credence individually
to be accurate, she’ll end up with a probability function.
However, whether an agent is calibrated depends in part on the relationship between
her credences. Moreover, since calibration is not even truth-directed, it is up to the accur-
acy rst epistemologist to explain why this global property of credence functions is related
to the rational pursuit of accuracy. She should not assume it from the start.
2.3. Veritism
The justication for DECOMPOSITION ultimately rests on Pettigrew’s view that calibration is
itself valuable. As he puts it:
The motivating intuition for the calibrationist accounts of accuracy that I would like to retain as
far as possible is that credences are better the closer they are to being well calibrated. . . . To retain
this motivating intuition, we say that, while . . . calibration accuracy cannot be the whole story
about accuracy because it is not truth-directed, it is nonetheless part of the story – calibration
accuracy is a component of accuracy. The other component of accuracy, I claim, is directly moti-
vated by the desideratum of truth-directedness. (p. 63)
There are two prima facie ways to understand Pettigrew’s views about the value of cali-
bration. On the rst reading, calibration accuracy, like accuracy-proper, is an intrinsically
valuable feature of a credence function. It’s one component of what makes a credence
function good that’s partly separable from, but compatible with, the goal of having cre-
dences close to truth-values.
On the second, weaker reading, high calibration accuracy is merely a property that we
somehow know accurate credence functions have. It may, on this view, be a byproduct or
spandrel property of valuable credence functions, in the sense that credence functions
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approximating the truth by necessity approximate the frequency of the truth. Any measure
that fails to appreciate this fact must be a lousy measure. In other words, the axiom of
DECOMPOSITION is justied because we notice that credences we judge inaccurate are always
either calibration inaccurate, or their well-calibrated counterparts are themselves inaccur-
ate, or both. This relationship is robust even though we don’t here value calibration accur-
acy per se. Proximity to truth, not proximity to frequency of truth, is the sole source of
goodness.
Now, valuing proximity to truth and to frequency-of-truth are compatible. After all,
scoring rules like B satisfy all of Pettigrew’s axioms and therefore satisfy both TRUTH-
DIRECTEDNESS and DECOMPOSITION. Nonetheless, if Pettigrew endorses this rst reading,
he must embrace a kind of value-pluralism. However, his whole project is based on value-
monism: Credences are valuable insofar and only insofar as they are near truth-values.
They cannot then acquire any additional value because of their proximity to certain fre-
quencies of truth-values. Compare: if Pettigrew were to value both accuracy and propor-
tioning one’s beliefs to the evidence, then he could not be a value monist even if he
maintained that these two values were never in conict.4 So, the rst reading is untenable
for accuracy-rsters like Pettigrew.
Moreover, this rst reading would belie Pettigrew’s claim that all legitimate inaccuracy
measures satisfy his ve axioms regardless of his stance on value-monism. For, if the
motivation for DECOMPOSITION appeals to the sui generis value of calibration, then there’s
no reason to think that legitimate measures of pure inaccuracy should satisfy it. Instead,
DECOMPOSITION would be a constraint on the class of legitimate inaccuracy measures that
are also plausible measures of total epistemic disutility. This reading thus undermines the
purely alethic argument for probabilism.
However, even the second reading is problematic for accuracy-rsters. Even if Pettigrew
does not think calibration accuracy is an independent and unalloyed good, it is nonethe-
less an explicitly anti-alethic notion that violates the fundamental constraint on any legit-
imate measure of inaccuracy, viz. TRUTH-DIRECTEDNESS. It is therefore surprising that
calibration accuracy has much to do with accuracy proper. The two notions – proximity
to truth-values and proximity to well-calibrated counterpart – appear to be in tension. The
fact that some measures such as the Brier Score satisfy DECOMPOSITION and Pettigrew’s
other axioms shows that this tension is not irresolvable, but it does not show what cali-
bration accuracy has to do with accuracy full-stop. Calibration is a derivative good
from a purely veritistic point of view. The relationship between reasonable measures of
inaccuracy and calibration, or any other notion that violates TRUTH-DIRECTEDNESS, should
be derived and not assumed.
3. conclusion
One of the great challenges of accuracy-rst epistemology is to characterize the class of
legitimate measures of inaccuracy. Pettigrew’s latest attempt explicitly appeals to the
4 In his (2013), Pettigrew explicitly endorses the view that following one’s evidence is a mere byproduct of
the goal of accuracy. He goes on to argue that alternative views (wrongly) endorse a kind of epistemic
value pluralism.
b. a . levinstein
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notion of calibration. I’ve argued that such an appeal is philosophically out of bounds for
Pettigrew and other accuracy-rst epistemologists.
First, the intuitive case for the evaluative importance of calibration isn’t as strong as
Pettigrew and other philosophers claim. Second, appealing to calibration renders the con-
cept of inaccuracy perniciously global. Third, calibration inaccuracy is non-alethic: some
perfectly calibrated credence functions are farther from the truth than uncalibrated ones.
Although it is true that there’s an important relationship between accuracy and calibra-
tion, this relationship should be derived. The importance of calibration is an explanandum
for accuracy-rsters, not an explanans.
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